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Industrial organization l?as always prided itself on its good relation with
reality. Its mission is tO apply to the facts the apparatus of microeco-
nomic theory developed by modelbuilders and systematic theoreticians.
It is concerned with policy, at least to the extent of providing the best
thought and analysis of economists to those who make policy. In its
widest focus it is concerned with the efficiency of the arrangements, or-
ganizations, and institutions that men rely on to guide the production of
what they need.
Changes in the field of industrial organization, therefore, may come
in two general ways: (1) changes in the methods and tools of economic
theory, which open up new paths of application; (2) changes in the real
problems that men deem to be important, arising from the evolution of
economic organization and from changes in the norms by which people
evaluate the performande of the economy.
The contemporary state of the subject illustrates both of these in-
fluences. The newer are best observed against the background
of the older formulation of the field, which has persisted for over 30
years and which still presents not only recurring policy issues but in-
numerable problems for research.
iNDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AS A SPECIALIST SUBJECT:
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
The "tradition" is not very old; it was generated by the great upsurge of
theoretical interest at the beginning of the 1930's in the economics of
the firm and of imperfectly competitive markets, represented by E. H.
Chamberlin [5],JoanRobinson [19], and their successors. By the end
of that decade its approach was set [14]. To be brief, it con-
sisted of an investigation of four main aspects of the firm and the market
(as well as some side issues):2 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
1. Structure, or the relatively fixed aspects of the market environ-
ment that are not easily changed by short-run business decisions. The
basic elements of market structure include the number and size distribu-
tion of sellers and buyers, the conditions of entry into the industry, de-
mand conditions (elastic or inelastic, etc.) and the nature of the product
(differentiated or homogeneous, etc.), cost conditions and technology,
and influences of labor and material markets and locational factors such
as transportation costs.
2. Conduct, or the behavior of firms in the market, ranging from
purely competitive or price-taking behavior by firms constrained by
atomistic structural conditions, to the typical maximizing behavior of a
single monopolist. The types of behavior of greatest interest to specialists
in industrial organization are, of course, those of oligopoly, or com-
petition among the few.
3. Performance, or the evaluation of the results observed in the
market. The most commonly used test of performance is the rate of
profit (deviations in either direction too far from the norm indicate poor
performance). But there are others—the size of selling costs in relation
to other opportunities for competitive performance, the flexibility of
prices in relation to costs, the propensity to innovate, to adopt improve-
ments in technology, and to pass the benefits along to buyers, and the
responsiveness of investment flows to profit opportunities.
4. Norms. These are the ultimate values by which the performance
of firms, industries, markets, or the entire economy is judged. The most
commonly recognized norms are: efficiency in the allocation of resources,
including efficiency in minimizing costs of production; progressiveness
in technology and organization; equity in income distribution and the
protection of legitimate rights of various groups in the economic process;
and stability of employment, incomes, and prices. These various norms
may conflict with each other, at least in part, which in turn can lead to
inconsistencies in the public policies that are responsive to them. The
conflict between efficiency and equity as norms of performance in eco-
nomic organization has become especially noteworthy in recent times.
Research in industrial organization has not—or not yet—succeeded
in constructing a completely connected system linking together these four•
aspects in an articulated reversible scheme for analysis and policy. Be-
sides producing a great deal of research on particular facets of structure
and types of behavior, it has established links between structure and per-
formance (as judged by certain norms) and has constructed some gen-Industrial Organization 3
eralizations on the relationship between structure and behavior in par-
ticular markets of the modern industrial state.
Investigations of economic performance usually bypass behavioral
problems and go directly to the configurations of market structure that
tend to produce adequate (or good) performance—generally judged by
the norm of allocative efficiency, since different norms may produce
different conclusions about structure. This inquiry makes use of a variety
of equilibrium models of the market. It usually relies on the purely
competitive model as an "ideal" of efficient resource allocation. The
relation between market structure and profit performance has been ex-
tensively researched.1 Less is known about the relation between market
structure and other norms—notably progressiveness—and hardly any-
thing about the effect of market structure on aggregate (macroeco-
nomic) stability. These are important issues, and we should continue to
try to learn more about the relationships.
Besides the approach to performance there is the approach to be-
havior. I have argued elsewhere [15] that insufficient attention has been
given to this kind of analysis—essentially positivist rather than norma-
tive. Perhaps it has had less appeal to economists because of their pre-
occupation with equilibrium solutions and with the efficiency norm. Be-
havioral analysis is concerned less with an evaluation of an equilibrium
result than with an ongoing process and its structural determinants. It
is a particularly interesting approach in oligopoly markets, which show
such marked deviations from simple equilibrium and such a wide dis-
persion of behavior patterns.
Economic analysis' has made some progress in predicting patterns
of behavior (conduct) in various kinds of markets, both oligopolistic
and nonoligopolistic, from certain combinations of structural elements.
We know, for example, what configurations of structure are likely to
produce basing-point strong price leadership; chronic price
warfare; market sharing; and that pattern of disorderly competition that
has come to be known as the "cartel syndrome." There is always some
danger of anecdotal explanations and ad hoc analysis in this approach.
Nevertheless I think we need to carry it much farther, with the aid of
new tools of analysis. We have some obligation as economists to ex-
plain the economic behavior that we observe, even though at present we
can't link up most behavior patterns with definite evaluations of per-
formance.
1 [2, 3, 6, II, 23], for example.4 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
Economic explanations of behavior have not yet made full use of
organization theory—that is, the behavioral theory of the firm and its
analysis as a functioning organism. Economists have usually assumed
that the firm is a single decisionmaking unit motivated entirely by the
desire for maximum profits—and for many purposes of economic analy-
sis nothing more is needed. But for analysis of behavior, particularly in
the oligopolistic markets where large firms have relatively wide options
and face a complex set of éonstraints, an amalgam of organization and
market theory should be fruitful.2 The pioneering work of Oliver Wil-
liamson [28], William Baumol [4], and other scholarsshould be pushed
along (and no doubt will be, by them and by others) until we can in-
corporate managerial economics and market analysis into the same
system, with common axioms and analytical structure.
Pushing back the frontiers of the major problems of industrial or-
ganization does not reduce the need for continued spadework in the
"old" areas. The need for factual input is enormous. The underlying
structure evolves, and our bank of information needs to be kept up to
date. New forms of organization appear, and the changes must be
evaluated, trends projected, effects of new technology predicted, and
changes in concentration and integration charted. Even such an old-
fashioned form as the traditional "industry study" fills a continuing need.
Without a continuous renewal of our fund of factual material and struc-
tural analysis in the basic categories of industrial organization, the more
advanced applications of the subject would eventually wither.
Other Research in the Familiar Directions
A considerable amount of research effort has been devoted to cer-
tain issues in industrial organization without producing final, or even
semifinal, answers that are satisfactory in the present milieu. The de-
ficiencies are partly due to the continued evolution of the problems. In
any case, more research is called for. Several examples follow.
1.Structureand Equity. For many years we have witnessed
the growing influence of equity on public policy and market organiza-
2 There is no good evidence that maximum profits as a goal of the enterprise
have been superseded by a managerial "utility function in five variables" (Adel-
man (1], p. 137). But profit maximizing does not necessarily lead to a predictable
equilibrium in oligopoly markets, nor does the goal explain the process of reach-
ing it.
3 Not forgetting the contributions from the direction of managerial science
by Cyert and March [71 and many others.Industrial Organization 5
tion.Economists, to the norm of allocative efficiency, have gen-
erally taken an unfavorable view of this trend. We have been prone to
view equity as a matter of the distribution of income, and economic
theory tells us that distributive considerations need not interfere with
efficiency in resource allocation. Once the economy meets the optimum
conditions for allocation, any distributive shortcoming can be met by
direct redistribution. There are no problems that can't be solved by pay-
ing someone a lump sum or collecting a lump sum from him.
Public officials and policymakers have shown little interest in this
prescription for a solution of the equity problems, nor have they found
the political means by direct income transfers could substitute for
other policies responsive to problems of equity. Instead, public policy
has frequently chosen to change market structure to deal with those
problems. It has, in Other words, created or fostered or protected
monopoly and organizational power to correct what was thought to be a
disadvantageous income position for certain groups. It has also done
this to protect other kinds of equitable rights. We used to call this the
"drift toward Syndicalis.m," though now we might call it the evolution
of the New Industrial State or perhaps the Emerging Tribe. The govern-
ment has not only conferred economic power upon groups to further
their own interests but has inevitably become involved in guiding the
relationships and settling disputes among these power blocs.
Both the rationalization and the consequences of such policies re-
main obscure. Public authorities often claim to be moved by the inferior
"bargaining power" of 0ertain groups to confer monopoly powers upon
them; yet the true economic basis of inferior bargaining power (which
must be related to market structure) has not been adequately investi-
gated nor demonstrated—nor have the effects of these policies upon
economic efficiency. Public policy seems to have undertaken a great
many individual alterations of market organization for the sake of equity
without even a partial-equilibrium prediction of the economic effects, let
alone of the consequences for the over-all configuration of the market
system. If the phenomenon is largely political or sociological, we are
again faced with the imperative necessity of working in the interdis-
ciplinary fields and approaching somewhat closer to a unified social
science—or at least todialogue with the other disciplines, which also
have their explanations and predictions of the newly emerging forms of
organization.4
If the free market were to be replaced entirely by direct negotiations and
quasi-political relations among organized groups, much of the economic theory of6 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
2. The Economics of Technological Change.It may appear
impertinent for anyone to suggest that more work remains to be done on
the economics of technological change, in view of the major book-length
studies that have recently appearedand the countless articles in the
professional journals during the last few decades. This work has un-
doubtedly greatly increased our knowledge. On some phases of the mat-
ter it has provided at least tentative answers to formerly puzzling ques-
tions, such as: do the degrees of monopoly and inventiveness show a
positive correlation; are the most monopolistic firms the most inventive;
and do the largest firms in technologically advanced industries typically
introduce most of the innovations? We are reasonably sure now that the
relation between market power and inventiveness (or progressiveness)
is not monotonic, though we are less sure of where the maximum is. We
know also that other variables affect the relationship strongly. Further
research might give policymakers the ability to fine-tune the relation-
ship between patent protection, for instance, and some target rate of
technological change in the economy, by altering the structure of induce-
ments to innovate and eliminating the "rents" or unnecessary returns.
Behind these questions, however, lurk others—vastly important,
and even farther from solution. One is the problem of determining the
optimum rate of technological change itself. To arrive at an estimate of
a target rate we would need to know three things that we do not know
now: (1) how to measure all of the effects of technological change, both
direct and indirect, in an immensely complex web of social interconnec-
tions—i.e., "technological evaluation" in economic terms; (2) how to
translate social values and norms, both economic and noneconomic, into
operationally applicable measures of social benefit and social harm; (3)
how to compare the marginal social cost of a technological change, in-
cluding the inefficiencies of allocation in the static sense that may be
necessary to induce innovation, with the marginal social benefits of the
change. This simple equivalence of marginal cost and marginal social
return is the test of welfare that we apply to practically every other
allocation of resources, yet we are not remotely able to apply it at the
present time to technological progress, which is itself an organic change
in the use of resources.6
the market would require transmutation, to a theory of group bargaining or multi-
lateral monopoly with a tincture of "countervailing power."
[12, 13, 16, 17, 20], to name some outstanding examples.
Uncertainty has been an impenetrable barrier to ex ante evaluation of inven-
tion and innovation. The noteworthy progress in the theory of risk and uncer-Industrial Organization 7
The normative nature of the problem has to be recognized. A sur-
vey of the literature reveals an extraordinarily uncritical acceptance of a
naive formulation of prbgress as a norm: it is "good"; so good that
faster is always better;good that any amount of technological prog-
ress, no matter how small, is worth any cost in terms of present distor-
tion of allocative efficiency, no matter how large; so good that all of the
side effects can be ignored. What we must do is work out the tradeoffs
against which to make normative choices, and analyze the externalities
and organizational impact of technology to a degree never before at-
tempted. Other branches of economics are involved in this research—
notably welfare which faces a peculiarly difficult task in
analyzing a dynamic prOcess in which both preferences and the means
of satisfying them are changing. But industrial organization should try
to attain a better understanding of the complex interactions between
innovation and market structure.
In addition to the suggested research on factor combinations and
market performance in technological change, we need better models of
the firm as an innovating mechanism. Invention innovation is a process
(whether creative or destructive in its ultimate effects) working through
an institutional structure.7 It seems to be partly volitional, partly adap-
tive, partly stochastic.also need better understanding of the natural
selection of successful innovation in the economic environment. These
are problems for social science, not for economics alone.
3. Regulatory Policy. Research on the old-line policy questions
keeps regenerating itself because the problems keep regenerating them-
selves. Specialists in the field, both lawyers and economists, well know
the delights of analyzing particular antitrust cases, at least the big ones,
which present a never-repeating kaleidoscope of variations in economic
facts and policy questions. But a somewhat more systematic effort is
required for the formulation of general policy, even after all this time.
The most recent formulations of economic standards for anti-
trust policy—the reports of the so-called Neal [25] and Stigler [27] task
forces—show how much still needs to be done.
tainty needs to be applied more searchingly to the economics of innovation to see
whether it will help to break the uncertainty barrier.
"R. A. Solo in a recent review [23] of the Mansfield volumes calls for a
framework for analysis that can "contain the generation, recapitulation, dissemi-
nation of information, the determinants of creativity, the process of learning by
individuals and groups,...thereceptivity or resistance to novelty" and other
elements of the process of technological change.8 Economic Research: Retrospect andProspect
The recommendations in the "Neal Report" for deconcentration of
concentrated industries were based on economic research (which was not
available to the Attorney General's Committee of the 1950's [261) that
indicated that economic performance in oligopoly tends to become dis-
tinctly unsatisfactory when the concentration rises above a critical zone
and when certain other structural conditions are present, such as block-
aded entry. These findings provide empirical reinforcement for a long-
standing public antipathy to economic concentration and market power
—an attitude supported, though somewhat gingerly, by the antitrust
laws. It is fair to say that economic research has not reached a position
of certainty on the relations between structure and performance.8 It
cannot yet give public policy entirely reliable guidance on every ques-
tion that arises in connection with industry structure and market be-
havior. I need only mention as an illustrative case the enigma of ad-
vertising as a barrier to entry.
For the present, no policy of drastic modification of existing in-
dustry structure in the U.S. appears likely. The only active questions of
structural change right now are those involving mergers and conglomer-
ate firms. In the case of the large conglomerate, our theory of the firm is
clearly inadequate to enable us to understand its nature or predict its
performance—more or less necessary prerequisites for advice to policy-
makers—though the combined trends in concentration and growth of
conglomerates into concentrated markets is sufficient cause for concern.
Research scholars have lately shown a very active interest in the con-
glomerate organization, demonstrated by the volume of publications on
conglomerate mergers.
Externalities, or the effects of activity by one organization or indus-
try upon others, is another aspect of industrial organization on which
research has taken a sudden upsurge. Few questions have elicited so
much popular interest in recent times as externalities, especially those
that fit under the rubrics of "pollution" and "conservation." Professional
interest has reacted similarly. I shall have more to say about this direc-
tion of research a little further on.
The effort to bring externalities under public control is merely one
aspect of a major proliferation of government controls and "policies" on
economic organization, abetted by what might be called the atrophy of
laissez-faire and loss of belief in the ability of a free economy to run
SEugeneM. Singer [22] says that the Neal Report shows "how far an
elementary structural approach can be carried in public policy."Industrial Organization 9
itself. It was formerly on the whole, that the government need
intervene only in those pases where the market failed to work, and failed
in an egregious Butone no longer hears of the dichotomy of the
public utilities and the The public utility industry is merely one
of a constellation of types which are all "regulated" in some degree, or
which at least government policies shaped to fit their micro-
economic structure. The predominant attitude among the public, if not
among economists, is that public policy—regulatory, monitory, cor-
rective, or protective_7is normally needed in most activities, and that
we probably don't have enough of it.
Economists who specialize in industrial organization have tried to
be of use in this climate of opinion, though sometimes without much
enthusiasm. Interest in regulation and regulatory problems has bur-
geoned. Economists have offered and will offer a great deal of advice to
public officials on how' to put regulation on a sound economic footing.
They have studied market failure in many industries, and recommended
new forms of policy to. deal with it. They have even studied the prob-
lem of limits to effective regulation and what might be called the flaws
in the regulatory solutjon to market imperfections.9 Given the current
drift in attitudes toward political economy, the increasing complexity and
interdependence of economic activity, and the proliferation of problems
that the market does not seem able to cope with effectively, this research
interest is bound to intensify. It deserves support, since better under-
standing of the relationship of regulation to industrial organization will
probably have a high payoff in the avoidance of gross errors of public
policy. (Of course, on both sides of this proposi-
tion.)
The New Industrial Organization
In the preface to his recent brilliant text on industrial organization,
William G. Shepherd
Some years ago, a senior colleague advised me that research
on market structure was mostly "wrapped up and done." Soon
thereafter another and younger friend, now a well-known specialist
in the field, urged upon me that the "old" industrial organization
9Allof these research interests are exemplified in the current program of
Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity of The Brookings Institution, as
well as in other research programs.10 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
field—by which he meant the issues which are covered in this book
—was "dead."
Shepherd's own book is conclusive testimony to the contrary, but
one is led to speculate on what the younger colleague had in mind. Was
there a "new" industrial organization that was alive and growing? Per-
haps not; but if there was, it was probably to be an econometric or
statistical one.
The intensive application of quantitative methods in all branches of
economics shows no signs of diminishing—indeed, most fledgLing econo-
mists now seem to win their wings this way—but there may be a little
less optimism than formerly about its ability to clarify outstanding diffi-
culties in economics. In industrial organization, quantitative research has
been applied chiefly to testing the relationship between industry struc-
ture and various dimensions of performance—an "old" problem. This
has been moderately illuminating. So has the simulation and statistical
testing of theorems about market behavior. The old squabbles about
rational behavior and the logical consequences of assumptions about
market structure do not seem to have been solved empirically, however:
they have been transmuted into squabbles about correspondence, identi-
fication, reliability of data, structure of equations, parameters, and sta-
tistical significance. Perhaps the greatest value that statistical testing has
for the research scholar (as opposed to the policymaker) is to send him
back to the drawing board repeatedly to see whether his theory and the
hypotheses drawn from it can't be improved.11
Besides testing the implications of market theory, quantitative
research has turned its attention to measuring various attributes of busi-
ness behavior and the productive structure of the firm. Some of this has
been quite useful, though it must be said that some appears to have been
undertaken merely because the tools of measurement were available and
someone wanted to try them out. Repetitive measurements and statistical
10 [21], p. v. For other pessimistic views, see [9, 10, 22].
11 Shepherd [21] notes, "To those willing to believe that if one cannot measure
X on the first try, then X doesn't exist, the scattered empirical findings have made
it possible to 'show' that concentrationis inconsequential" (pp. 21—22). Also:
"The rush to 'test' concepts empirically has degenerated frequently into a sort of
scientism, in which a lack of findings in a faulty test using slender evidence was
asserted to disprove the existence of otherwise likely phenomena" (p. 23). Gra-
bowski and Mueller [9], p.100, further assert that "we stand in the danger of
seeing the period of infancy in the application of econometrics to industrial
organization coincide with its zenith, unless we are able to develop better theories
and/or come up with better data than are presently available."Industrial Organization 11
formulations of endless varieties of production functions, for example,
go into the data bankbuilding blocks for future systematic formula-
tions on a theoretical foundation. Building blocks are useful, even essen-
tial, things to have, as as we don't use them to build the Tower of
Babel.
THE NEW, NEW INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Earlier in this survey I referred to several "familiar" directions of re-
search in industrial organization—including (1) concern with problems
of equity and (2) concern with evaluating the causes and
consequences of technological change; (3) concern with external costs
and benefits which escape accounting and evaluation in existing market
organization; (4) concern with the public role in economic life and its
tendency to enlarge itself as people become dissatisfied with the results
of free, uncontrolled iarkets. The quantitative methods mentioned
above have created some new and refined tools for this research but they
do not in themselves change its meaning.
But if we push these concerns far enough, we leave the familiar
territory of industrial Organization—in truth, of orthodox economics
itself—and sail beyond the edge of the charts. We have long known that
those regions were out ithere,but with a kind of notional assent not
involving systematic research interest. Now, however, the
problems beckon.
The swell of discontent with our industrial society, its institutions,
and its organizations is 'reaching such proportions that economists who
concern themeselves with "organization" must soon decide whether they
are going to participate in this debate or to disdain the whole matter as
an unscientific uproar created by an undisciplined rabble. If we decide
to ignore it we run somó risk of losing "relevance" to the problems that
vast numbers of our and other fellow citizens think are impor-
tant. Yet it is difficult for an "orthodox" economist to make
much sense out of this uproar or to use his battery of analytic tools, as
they exist now, to carve out solutions. It is no wonder that most of my
colleagues regard this newest wave with mingled puzzlement and ex-
asperation. Even those ¼vho participate in it seem to leave their scienti-
fic apparatus behind in 'the classrooms and laboratories as they run out
to join the mobs on quad.
The extreme view, being disorderly, cannot be summed up in a
single formulation. It is not all new, since it contains many fragments of12 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
old soáialism ranging from the Marxist to the Utopian. So far as one
can discern the form of its basic attitudes on economics through the
burning haze of its rhetoric, they seem to be about as follows. Most
"goods" are actually bads, not produced to satisfy any fundamental
human needs or wants, and forced on an apathetic populace by a greedy
and irresponsible group of giant corporations. This view denies the
primacy of wants. Consumer behavior in the marketplace is said to be
the result of manipulation. Satisfaction of wants is illusory.'2 Self-interest
is thought to be equivalent to greed and to the intent to exploit others;
the invisible hand is a myth; the enterprise system in the "free market"
is actually an engine which encourages and facilitates the exploitation
of some groups by others. A variant of this view is that industry or the
"corporate state" are altogether out of human control, having made
unwitting captives of the people who are supposed to own and direct it.
Technology has become self-directed, and the corporate state in both its
industrial and governmental aspectsiscompletely unresponsive to
human needs.
The new-radical view of human nature (from which "economic
man" has been expelled) is, of course, Rousseauist, in contrast to the
Hobbesian view that most orthodox economists over thirty come to when
they go behind the symbols and axioms to the substance of behavior and
motivation. It follows that the rebels want to make interpersonal com-
parisons the very basis of public policy. In their view, human beings
(and maybe other species too) are absolutely equal, and apparently are
to have common rights in all attributes and usufructs of social organiza-
tion, not excepting the economy.
Strong views, these, and very hard words. What should we make
of them? I will leave it to others to deal with the welfare and behavioral
aspects of the new wave, and consider what might result for research in
"industrial organization" if we take it seriously.
To use the conventional language of economics, one major concern
of the critics is with externalities. It would be wrong to say that econo-
mists have not been concerned with externalities; there is a voluminous
literature defining them, analyzing their origins, and deducing their we!-
fare implications. Activities generating external benefits (scientific re-
12 As Charles Reich expressed this view in a recent article "Advertising
is designed to create, and does create, dissatisfaction. But dissatisfaction is no mere
toy. If one creates a desire for sex, status, and excitement, and then sells a man
an automobile, the desire is likely to remain unsatisfied. The wants created, are
real enough, but the satisfactions are unreal" (p. 89).Industrial Organization 13
search, education, landscaping) and external costs (rendering plants,
dilapidated housing, commercial fishing) are well-known. What is new
is the enormous increase both in the scope of externalities and in public
awareness of them.
Economists should increase their own contribution to knowledge of
these phenomena; they already begun to do so. I do not say that our
analysis will lead to the point where we can write down a single produc-
tion function for the whole economic system. But such research would
in all probability our awareness of the interdependence of eco-
nomic activity along with providing the rest of the world with a more
accurate picture of what the interrelationships, costs, and benefits really
are.'3 Industrial organization is necessarily involved in research on exter-
nalities because of the industrial locus of much of the problem and
because any rational solutions are likely to require policies that alter the
workings of certain markets—perhaps of most markets. These solutions
may not satisfy all of the critics, of course, but then economics is not an
apocalyptic discipline.
Similar efforts are called for on the other matters mentioned above.
Ultimately, specialists in industrial organization may be expected to
answer the question of whether large, bureaucratic organizations staffed
by specialists are necessary in industry and government to make an
economy based on an advanced technology work with tolerable effi-
ciency; 14 or, if some other set of goals is advanced as an alternative to the
ones that have guided economic growth for two centuries, to de-
termine what the conse4uences might be for the organization of produc-
tion and distribution. are really in a process of change from an ex-
tensive, waste-making, progressive, space-using, technologically oriented
society toward an intensive, conserving, relatively static society oriented
primarily toward and the needs of social participation, the im-
plications for industrial organization will be profound. All agencies of
economic and social research will be called on to participate in solving
the problems.
13 For a laboratory we might consider the true costs and benefits of
energy production and in the United States.
'-'i Similar questionsoften asked by other analysts who do not necessarily
share the attitudes of the critics: cf. Gaibraith [8].14 Research: Retrospect and Prospect
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